Sunday, September 13, 2026

The Door Is the Most Dangerous Part

At about five o'clock in the morning on September 10, 2026, members of the Hernando County Sheriff's Office SWAT team approached a house in Spring Hill, Florida, to execute a search warrant connected to an investigation into cocaine sales. This wasn't a couple of patrol officers wandering blindly into an unknown disturbance. It was a planned operation. Marked police vehicles were outside with their emergency lights flashing. A SWAT BearCat was positioned near the residence. Deputies repeatedly announced over a loudspeaker that they were from the sheriff's office and ordered the occupant to come outside. (Hernando County Sheriff's Office)

Then they went to the door.

As deputies attempted to breach it, 29-year-old Anthony Cusati allegedly fired multiple rounds from inside the house, straight through the door. Deputy Jonathan Allion was struck in the arm. Sgt. Scott Lewis, an 11-year veteran, was hit in the upper left leg and in the center of his body armor. One of the rounds struck his body-worn camera. The deputies did not return fire because, according to Sheriff Al Nienhuis, they couldn't see the man shooting at them. Both deputies survived and were eventually released from the hospital. Cusati was taken into custody and faces multiple charges, including attempted murder of law-enforcement officers.

There is a lesson in those few seconds that every cop understands.

The door is the most dangerous part.

Not every door, of course. Most doors open and nothing happens. I stood in front of more doors during my police career than I could possibly remember. They belonged to houses, apartments, hotel rooms, businesses and places that probably shouldn't have qualified as residences at all. Behind them were victims, suspects, frightened children, angry husbands, crying wives, drunks, people having mental-health crises, people who didn't want the police there and people desperately waiting for us to arrive.

Most of the time, somebody opened the door.

That's precisely what makes doors dangerous.

Police work teaches you to recognize danger, but repetition teaches you something else. Do something a thousand times without being hurt and the extraordinary begins to feel ordinary. A domestic becomes another domestic. A disturbance becomes another disturbance. A welfare check becomes another welfare check.

And a door becomes just another door.

Until it isn't.

A closed door creates one of the fundamental inequalities of police work. The person on the inside may know considerably more than the officer standing outside. He knows the layout of the house. He knows where the furniture is. He knows where the hallway leads. He knows whether there is another exit. Most importantly, he knows what he intends to do when that door opens.

The officer may know none of those things.

The person inside may be watching through a peephole or a window. He may hear the officers talking. He may know exactly where they are standing. He may be frightened. He may be hiding. He may be destroying evidence. He may be holding a telephone.

Or he may be holding a gun.

The officer outside gets none of those answers from looking at the door.

That's why good police tactics begin with respecting the unknown. Officers can avoid unnecessarily standing directly in front of a doorway. They can use available cover and distance. Partners can position themselves so they aren't presenting one convenient target. Officers can pay attention not merely to the door but to windows and other places from which somebody might observe or attack them. They can gather as much information as circumstances permit before making contact and communicate what they see, hear and know to one another.

Sometimes the most important tactic is simply slowing down.

A radio call is only the information available when somebody transmitted it. The situation encountered by the officers belongs to them. Something heard through the door, movement behind a curtain, contradictory information from a neighbor or simply circumstances that don't fit what dispatch originally reported can change the problem. Good officers continually reassess what they are actually dealing with rather than stubbornly proceeding with what they were originally told.

And when circumstances allow it, sometimes the safest decision is not to go through the door at all—at least not yet.

None of that eliminates the danger.

The Florida shooting demonstrates that particularly well because these weren't inexperienced officers casually walking up to a house. They were SWAT personnel conducting a planned warrant service. They had equipment, preparation, multiple officers and advance knowledge that they were entering an environment associated with suspected criminal activity.

They still had to deal with the door.

Training isn't magic. Body armor isn't magic. A ballistic shield isn't magic. Experience certainly isn't magic. All of them can improve the odds, sometimes dramatically, but none gives an officer the one thing he would really like to have at that moment: the ability to see the future.

In fact, experience presents a danger of its own.

A rookie can be afraid of every door. Everything is new, and everything therefore looks potentially dangerous. Twenty years later, the problem can reverse itself. The experienced officer has knocked on thousands of doors. Almost all of them opened without somebody shooting through them.

That experience is invaluable. It can also whisper something dangerous:

You've done this before.

That's where professionalism has to overcome familiarity. The objective isn't to make every officer terrified every time he walks onto a porch. Fear isn't a tactic. The objective is to maintain enough respect for uncertainty that the thousandth door receives the attention that might save you when it happens to be the wrong one.

There is another uncomfortable truth here. The only way to eliminate the danger completely is not to approach the door.

Police officers don't have that option.

Somebody has to answer the domestic disturbance. Somebody has to check on the elderly woman whose neighbors haven't seen her for three days. Somebody has to investigate the screaming coming from an apartment. Somebody has to find the armed suspect. Somebody has to serve the warrant.

Somebody still has to go.

That means officer safety can never mean eliminating danger. Policing itself makes that impossible. The professional objective is to identify foreseeable dangers, reduce unnecessary exposure and improve the odds while still accomplishing the job society has sent the officer there to do.

Then comes something else I've come to appreciate about police shootings and body-camera video: afterward, everybody gets to see through the door.

Investigators eventually know who was inside. They know what weapon he possessed. They know where he was standing. They reconstruct where the bullets traveled. Attorneys can examine the evidence. Supervisors can replay the video. Reporters can interview witnesses. People on social media can freeze three seconds of footage and study those three seconds for three days.

All of that scrutiny has a legitimate place. Police decisions should be reviewed, and bad decisions should not be excused merely because policing is dangerous.

But hindsight gives the rest of us something the officer standing on the porch never had.

The cutaway view.

Imagine the scene as a painting. It is nighttime. Two officers stand beneath an ordinary porch light. One is positioned beside the door. The other raises his hand to knock.

Now remove the wall for the viewer.

On the other side is a disheveled man staring through the peephole. He has a shotgun in his hands. He knows exactly where the officers are.

We know what's coming.

The officers don't.

Position matters. Cover matters. Communication matters. Training matters. Experience matters. Each can move the odds in the officer's favor, and sometimes one small tactical decision is the reason an officer goes home.

But none of them can remove the unknown from the other side of the door.

Eventually, somebody still has to knock.

And that's why the door may be the most dangerous part.

Wednesday, September 09, 2026

DEA Marks 25 Years After 9/11 by Honoring Fallen Task Force Officers and Opening Special Museum Exhibit

Never Forget: 25 Years After 9/11 Features Artifacts from the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and United Flight 93

WASHINGTON, D.C. – The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration commemorated the 25th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks with a ceremony at DEA Headquarters honoring those killed that day and those who later died from 9/11-related illnesses. The ceremony also marked the opening of Never Forget: 25 Years After 9/11, a DEA Museum limited-run exhibit.

“Never Forget” is DEA’s solemn promise to preserve the legacy of those lost in the line of duty and to honor the courage, service, and sacrifice demonstrated in the days, months, and years following the attacks.

During the ceremony, DEA Administrator Terry Cole unveiled the names of two New York Drug Enforcement Task Force Officers newly added to the DEA’s 9/11 memorial:

  • New York State Police Investigator Anthony B. Ashe, who died on November 4, 2024
  • New York City Police Department Detective James J. Motto, who died on January 12, 2025
  • DEA dedicated the memorial in 2022 to honor members of the New York Drug Task Force who died from illnesses or diseases related to their work at Ground Zero.  The memorial bears the names of:
  • New York State Police Senior Investigator Thomas G. Moran, Jr., who died on July 22, 2012
  • New York City Police Department Detective Traci L. Tack-Czajkowski, who died on January 15, 2013
  • New York State Police Investigator Paul R. Stuewer, who died on October 5, 2016
  • New York City Police Department Detective Mark Mkwanazi, who died on February 16, 2017
  • New York City Police Department Detective Thomas J. Barnitt, who died on June 11, 2018
  • New York City Police Department Sergeant Robert P. Masci, who died on June 9, 2018
  • New York City Police Department Detective Terence P. Mulvey, who died on December 1, 2021

DEA’s 9/11 memorial is a lasting tribute to the selfless service of the men and women who responded to the attacks and a reminder that, for many responders and their families, the sacrifice continued long after September 11, 2001.                                                                                                  

“Twenty-five years later, the pain of September 11 remains, as does our profound gratitude for every person who answered the call to serve,” said DEA Administrator Terry Cole. “Today, as we add two more names to DEA’s memorial, we are reminded that the sacrifice of 9/11 did not end when the smoke cleared. We honor those we lost, stand with the families who carry their memory, and remember the courage of those who stepped forward when our nation needed them most. For DEA, ‘Never Forget’ is more than a promise. It is a responsibility we carry forward through our service to this country.”

Following the 9/11 attacks, DEA brought unique authorities and expertise to the nation’s response to terrorism, targeting the intersection of drug trafficking and terrorist financing. DEA subsequently established the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team (FAST) program, which deployed an elite team of DEA agents to work alongside U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Working with the DEA Kabul Country Office (KCO), FAST/KCO teams identified and targeted Afghanistan's top drug traffickers, disrupted the opium and heroin trade, and dismantled financial networks that helped fund and support the terrorist organizations connected to the 9/11 attacks.

This history carries special significance for DEA’s current leadership team including Administrator Cole and several other senior DEA leaders who served with FAST/KCO during DEA’s mission in Afghanistan. Artifacts from this time are currently on display in the DEA Museum. 

Today’s ceremony also marked the official opening of Never Forget: 25 Years After 9/11. For the first time, the DEA Museum is displaying artifacts connected to all three attacks on September 11 – the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the crash site of United Flight 93 near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.

The exhibit features powerful images, firsthand accounts, and rarely displayed artifacts, including rubble from the Pentagon, metal recovered from the World Trade Center, and objects from the Flight 93 crash site. It also includes accounts from retired DEA personnel who were at DEA Headquarters on September 11 and witnessed the attack on the Pentagon.

The exhibit chronicles DEA’s response to the attacks, including the agency’s assistance at the Pentagon and Ground Zero; Aviation Division missions transporting blood supplies and conducting flights over Ground Zero; and the service of more than 1,000 DEA Special Agents who volunteered for temporary assignments as Federal Air Marshals.

Never Forget: 25 Years After 9/11 will remain on display through October 3, 2026.

The DEA Museum and Visitors Center is located at 700 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Va., is free and open to the public Tuesday through Saturday from 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.

For additional information, visit museum.dea.gov

 

Monday, September 07, 2026

The Day Sweet Bobby Lost His Mind Over a Watermelon

Almost forty-five years ago, when I was a probationary police officer assigned to Newton Street, I learned that some of the best stories in a police station were the ones you didn't actually see happen. This is one of those. I saw some of the aftermath firsthand, but most of what happened I pieced together from conversations around the station, listening to the people who had been there and the people who had heard about it before I did. That's the way stories traveled through a police division in those days, and by the time I arrived, this one had already become part of Newton Street lore.

We had a watch commander I'll call Sweet Bobby Jones. Sweet Bobby was a big man, an overweight African American sergeant who had strong opinions about almost everything and wasn't particularly reluctant to share them. More importantly, he was a Sergeant II. On an LAPD uniform that meant three stripes with a rocker underneath, and making Sergeant II in those days was an accomplishment. Whatever else anybody thought about Sweet Bobby, he had earned some rank and authority along the way.

He also had a tendency to rant. He could come into roll call, find something that offended his sense of how police work ought to be done, and get going. He was funny, though, and I think he knew it. Once Sweet Bobby got wound up, everybody got the benefit of his opinion, and apparently a couple of officers decided one night that it might be entertaining to help him get wound up.

Their plan was simple enough. They created a completely fictitious assault-with-a-deadly-weapon report and waited until close to end of watch to turn it in. Timing was part of the joke. Sweet Bobby would be trying to get through the last of the paperwork, sign everything that needed to be signed, clear the watch and go home. The officers apparently suspected that under those circumstances he wasn't reading every word of every report put in front of him, and they decided to test the theory.

The report described an assault with a deadly weapon. The names were fictitious, the circumstances were fictitious, the crime was fictitious, and buried in the narrative was the detail they expected would bring Sweet Bobby to life.

The deadly weapon was a watermelon.

Somebody had supposedly assaulted somebody else with a watermelon, and the officers who created the report expected Sweet Bobby to get to that part, realize what they had handed him and explode. Presumably they would get a memorable end-of-watch rant out of him, everybody would have a good laugh, and the report would disappear.

Except Sweet Bobby didn't read it.

He signed it.

That should have ended the joke. The officers had proven whatever point they were trying to prove: put something in front of Sweet Bobby at the end of watch, when he was in a hurry to get everything cleared, and there was a good chance he would sign it without reading it closely. They had their story. Somebody should have pulled the report out of the paperwork, admitted what they had done and thrown the thing away.

Instead, somehow, the report kept going.

It went to Records, where nobody had any particular reason to suspect that a properly completed crime report bearing the watch commander's signature was a practical joke. It was processed and duplicated. It received the appropriate numbers, including its division reference number, and entered the LAPD system as what it purported to be: an actual assault-with-a-deadly-weapon report.

By the next morning, the watermelon had made it to detectives.

Normally, the Detective III supervising the crimes-against-persons table would have handled the assignment of incoming cases, but he happened to be off. Another detective was filling in and doing the Detective III's job that morning, which included assigning cases to investigators. Across his desk came an apparently legitimate ADW report. It had been written, approved by a watch commander, processed through Records and given all the numbers an actual crime report was supposed to have.

So he assigned it to a pair of seasoned detectives.

And they began investigating it.

By then, this ridiculous watermelon had traveled remarkably far through the Los Angeles Police Department. A couple of patrol officers had invented the crime. A Sergeant II had signed the report without reading it. Records had processed it. The system had accepted it. A detective acting in a supervisory capacity had assigned it, and now two experienced investigators were spending their time trying to solve an assault that had never occurred.

Somewhere in the course of that investigation, the thing finally began to unravel. There was no victim to interview, no suspect to find and no crime scene to examine. The names in the report weren't real because the officers who wrote it had invented them. Eventually the seasoned detectives reached the only conclusion available to them: there hadn't been an assault with a deadly weapon. There hadn't been an assault at all.

There hadn't even been a watermelon.

At that point, however, there actually was something to investigate. Somebody had created a fictitious crime report and introduced it into the LAPD reporting system. What had begun as a practical joke intended to make a watch commander rant had gone through Records and far enough into the investigative process that two detectives had actually begun working the case.

I don't remember all of what happened administratively after that, and almost forty-five years later I'm not going to manufacture details to fill in what I don't know. I was a probationary officer at Newton Street when I heard about it, and I saw enough of the aftermath firsthand to know that the joke had gone considerably farther than anybody who created it had intended. The rest came through the conversations that followed, because something like this wasn't going to happen in a police station without everybody eventually hearing about it.

I do know that somewhere along the way Sweet Bobby learned what had happened. He learned that the report he'd signed without reading was a setup, that the deadly weapon was a watermelon, and that his signature had allowed the joke to escape the station and turn into an actual detective investigation.

And then Sweet Bobby went off.

Which, when you think about it, was exactly what the officers had wanted him to do in the first place.

It had just taken a little longer than they expected.

That was the day Sweet Bobby Jones lost his mind over a watermelon.