Defendant Collected and Caused Sensitive FBI Information to
be Provided to the Chinese Government
Kun Shan Chun, a native of the People’s Republic of China
and a naturalized U.S. citizen, pleaded guilty today to a criminal information
charging him with acting in the United States as an agent of China without
providing prior notice to the Attorney General.
Assistant Attorney General for National Security John P.
Carlin, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara of the Southern District of New York and
Assistant Director in Charge Diego P. Rodriguez of the FBI’s New York Field
Office made the announcement.
Chun, aka Joey Chun, 46, pleaded guilty before U.S.
Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV of the Southern District of New York. He was an employee of the FBI until his
arrest on March 16, 2016.
“Kun Shan Chun violated our nation’s trust by exploiting his
official U.S. Government position to provide restricted and sensitive FBI
information to the Chinese Government,” said Assistant Attorney General
Carlin. “Holding accountable those who
work as illegal foreign agents to the detriment of the United States is among
the highest priorities of the National Security Division.”
“Americans who act as unauthorized foreign agents commit a
federal offense that betrays our nation and threatens our security,” said U.S.
Attorney Bharara. “And when the
perpetrator is an FBI employee, like Kun Shan Chun, the threat is all the more
serious and the betrayal all the more duplicitous. Thanks to the excellent investigative work of
the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, the FBI succeeded in identifying and
rooting out this criminal misconduct from within its own ranks.”
“No one is above the law, to include employees of the FBI,”
said Assistant Director in Charge Rodriguez.
“We understand as an agency we are trusted by the public to protect our
nation’s most sensitive information, and we have to do everything in our power
to uphold that trust.”
According to the complaint, the information and statements
made during today’s court proceeding:
In approximately 1997, Chun began working at the FBI’s New
York Field Office as an electronics technician assigned to the Computerized
Central Monitoring Facility of the FBI’s Technical Branch. In approximately 1998, and in connection with
his employment, the FBI granted Chun a Top Secret security clearance and his
duties included accessing sensitive, and in some instances classified,
information. In connection with a
progressive recruitment process, Chun received and responded to taskings from
Chinese nationals and at least one Chinese government official (Chinese
Official-1), some, if not all, of whom were aware that Chun worked at the
FBI. On multiple occasions prior to his
arrest in March 2016, at the direction of Chinese government officials, Chun
collected sensitive FBI information and caused it to be transmitted to Chinese
Official-1 and others, while at the same time engaging in a prolonged and
concerted effort to conceal from the FBI his illicit relationships with these
individuals.
Beginning in 2006, Chun and some of his relatives maintained
relationships with Chinese nationals purporting to be affiliated with a company
in China named Zhuhai Kolion Technology Company Ltd. (Kolion). Chun maintained an indirect financial
interest in Kolion, including through a previous investment by one of his
parents. In connection with these
relationships, Chinese nationals asked Chun to perform research and consulting
tasks in the United States, purportedly for the benefit of Kolion, in exchange
for financial benefits, including partial compensation for international
trips.
Between 2006 and 2010, Chun’s communications and other
evidence reflect inquiries from purported employees of Kolion to Chun while he
was in the United States, as well as efforts by the defendant to collect, among
other things, information regarding solid-state hard drives.
In approximately 2011, during a trip to Italy and France
partially paid for by the Chinese nationals, Chun was introduced to Chinese
Official-1, who indicated that he worked for the Chinese government and that he
knew Chun worked for the FBI. During
subsequent private meetings conducted abroad between the two, Chinese
Official-1 asked questions regarding sensitive, non-public FBI information. During those meetings, Chun disclosed, among
other things, the identity and potential travel patterns of an FBI Special
Agent.
In approximately 2012, the FBI conducted a routine
investigation relating to Chun’s Top Secret security clearance. In an effort to conceal his relationships
with Chinese Official-1 and the other Chinese nationals purporting to be
affiliated with Kolion, Chun made a series of false statements on a
standardized FBI form related to the investigation. Between 2000 and March 16, 2016, Chun was
required by FBI policy to disclose anticipated and actual contact with foreign
nationals during his international travel, but he lied on numerous pre- and
post-trip FBI debriefing forms by omitting his contacts with Chinese
Official-1, other Chinese nationals and Kolion.
On multiple occasions, Chinese Official-1 asked Chun for
information regarding the FBI’s internal structure. In approximately March 2013, Chun downloaded
an FBI organizational chart from his FBI computer in Manhattan. Chun later admitted to the FBI that, after
editing the chart to remove the names of FBI personnel, he saved the document
on a piece of digital media and caused it to be transported to Chinese
Official-1 in China.
Chinese Official-1 also asked Chun for information regarding
technology used by the FBI. In approximately
January 2015, Chun took photos of documents displayed in a restricted area of
the FBI’s New York Field Office, which summarized sensitive details regarding
multiple surveillance technologies used by the FBI. Chun sent the photographs to his personal
cell phone and later admitted to the FBI that he caused the photographs to be
transported to Chinese Official-1 in China.
In approximately February 2015, the FBI caused an undercover
employee (UCE) to be introduced to Chun.
The UCE purported to be a U.S. citizen who was born in China and working
as a consultant to several firms, including an independent contractor for the
Department of Defense, among other entities.
During a recorded meeting in March 2015, Chun told the UCE
about his relationship with Kolion and Chinese nationals and later explained to
the UCE that Kolion had “government backing,” and that approximately five years
prior a relative met a “section chief” whom Chun believed was associated with
the Chinese government.
In another recorded meeting in June 2015, Chun told the UCE
that he had informed his Chinese associates that the UCE was a consultant who
might be in a position to assist them.
Chun said that he wished to act as a “sub-consultant” to the UCE and
wanted the UCE to “pay” him “a little bit.”
In July 2015, after coordinating travel to meet Chun’s Chinese
associates, Chun met with the UCE in Hungary twice. During one of the meetings, Chun stated that
he knew “firsthand” that the Chinese government was actively recruiting individuals
who could provide assistance and that the Chinese government was willing to
provide immigration benefits and other compensation in exchange for such
assistance. The UCE told Chun that he
had access to sensitive information from the U.S. government. Chun responded that his Chinese associates
would be interested in that type of information and that Chun expected a “cut”
of any payment that the UCE received for providing information to the Chinese
government.
The count of acting in the United States as an agent of
China without providing notice to the Attorney General carries a maximum
sentence of 10 years in prison. The
maximum potential sentence is prescribed by Congress and is provided here for
informational purposes only, as any sentencing of the defendant will be
determined by the judge.
The FBI’s Counterintelligence Division investigated the
case. The prosecution is being handled
by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Emil J. Bove III and Andrea L. Surratt of the Southern
District of New York’s Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit, with
assistance provided by Trial Attorneys Thea D. R. Kendler and David C. Recker
of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control
Section.
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